

Defence & Strategic Analyses

2017

Enhancing NADI as Track II Network of Think Tanks

Ampuan Yura Kasumawati binti DP Hj Adnan

Perspectives on Countering Extremist Narratives: Integrated Efforts and Approaches within ASEAN

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Defence Diplomacy and Cooperation: Contribution to Brunei and Region

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Refana binti Mohd Juanda

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SHHBIDSS

Defence Strategic and Analyses (DSA)

The mission of the Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (SHHBIDSS), as the Ministry of Defence's policy research institute, is to study and discuss defence, security and strategic issues relevant to Brunei Darussalam and its surrounding environment.

The Defence Strategic and Analyses (DSA) is a publication of SHHBIDSS covering aspects of defence, security and strategic issues. It aims to share perspectives and promote awareness related to but not limited to issues under its Research Programmes in the Defence Management Studies, Defence and Military Studies and Regional Strategic and Security Studies.

DSA 2017 is based on the commentaries by SHHBIDSS researchers in Track 2 engagements in the region including The Track 2 Network of Defence and Security Institutions (NADI) and their own papers that reviews and assess the various regional security developments and challenges.

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1. Enhancing NADI as Track II Network of Think Tanks¹

Ampuan Yura Kasumawati binti DP Hj Adnan



Established in 2007, the Network of ASEAN Defence and Security Institutions (NADI) has achieved significant milestones. As the only network of defence think tanks between ASEAN, NADI is in a position to be the main Track II network of think tanks to support the ADMM (ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting). Although the work of NADI has increasingly been recognised by the ADMM, there has not been any formal feedback from the ADMM on NADI's recommendations that were submitted for its considerations. There is also an absence of a mechanism to monitor and review overall NADI activities fulfilling its objectives set in its Terms of Reference. Improvements in these two areas can be the focus in enhancing NADI's contribution and profile as a relevant Track II network of think tanks in the region.



1.1. Overview

NADI is the only recognised Track II network of think tanks associated with the ADMM. Other Track II networks of think tanks namely ASEAN ISIS, CSCAP and NEAT are associated with the same stakeholder under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs namely the ASEAN SOM, ARF and APT respectively. Over the years, NADI has taken efforts to share its activity outcomes and recommendations to ADSOM. The endorsement of the Concept Paper on *Enhancing Linkages between ADMM and NADI* by the ADSOM Working Group (WG) in February 2017 further institutionalises a formal channel of communication between Track I and Track II. This is a step forward from the initial informal dialogue between the Chairman of NADI and ADSOM WG Leader together with other interested NADI members held in 2013.

As the only defence network between ASEAN countries, it is in a position to be the main Track II network of think tanks to support the ADMM. References have been made to NADI and ASEAN-ISIS as a source of new insights and perspectives on defence cooperation in the ADMM three-year work programme 2017-

¹ This commentary was prepared for the 10th NADI Annual Meeting on NADI from 27 to 30 March 2017, taking place in Conrad Hotel, Manila, the Philippines.

2019. With the upcoming ten-year anniversary of its establishment, it is timely for NADI to reconsider ways to enhance its role and strengthen its contribution to the defence and security discourse. More importantly, it must ensure it remains relevant and become a more effective Track II network of think tanks for ASEAN, and the ADMM in particular.

1.2. Reflect: Ten Years of NADI

From NADI's establishment in 2007, NADI has agreed to support the ADMM. This is by providing a platform of discussion in a Track II setting on issues relating to defence and security cooperation that the ASEAN Summit and ASEAN Defence Ministers had raised, as well as fresh ideas and issues that are ahead of the curve. In fulfilling this objective, NADI has carried out various forms of interactions among its members that consist of workshops, an annual meeting and a retreat held every two years on a needs basis.




Figure 1 shows the Multilateral Defence Engagement Ecosystem

The workshop is NADI's central engagement where it has discussed on a range of issues. Over the years, NADI have covered on HADR (5), Maritime related issues (4), ASEAN, Defence and Strategic matters (5), Terrorism (2), PKO (1), Emerging issues (2 - security) and others (2 - nation building, Energy). The topic focus is very much driven by the hosts of the workshops. Thus far, the ADMM has recognised the role of NADI and noted the outcomes of NADI activities. However, there is no track record or official feedback on NADI recommendations in the ADMM. There is also an absence of a mechanism to monitor and review overall NADI activities in fulfilling its objectives set in its TOR.

As with any other Track II networks, there is always room to improve and continue to build on the momentum of cooperation within NADI. In observation, the main issues in the conduct of NADI activities from the aspects of relevance, substance and administration that needs further consideration of NADI are as follow:

Relevance	Substance	Administrative
<p><i>Acceptance of NADI outputs by the ADMM:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ongoing and in-depth discussions on defence and security surrounding. ▪ Balanced activities that adds value to Track I. 	<p><i>Narratives and fewer concrete recommendations:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Focus-based and build on past workshops to be ahead of the curve. ▪ Targeted deliverables. ▪ Sharpen relevance of policy recommendation. ▪ Concise report of outcomes. 	<p><i>Packed 2.5 days programme:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Review conduct of activities to develop further conducive environment for discussions to enable creative thinking and provide fresh ideas.

1.2.1. Rethink: Lessons Learned and Best Practices of other Track II Network of Think Tanks

Looking at the other Track II networks in association with Track I, there are persistent challenges despite efforts to enhance policy dialogue among members of Track II networks of think tanks. This includes interactive engagements and consideration of Track II policy recommendations by Track I have been dependent on the priorities of the Chairman. Another challenge for Track II networks of think tanks is also to ascertain impact (influence or usefulness) of policy memorandums of Track II in Track I fora.




Figure 2 shows the purposes of NADI

In studying the conduct of activities as a policy dialogue platform, members of Track II networks of think tanks have general practices in ensuring their contributions are relevant. This would start with the highest committee meeting to discuss and agree on the study or issue of focus for the year. Smaller working groups can be established that consists of interested members to discuss and provide outcome of meetings. The group would work offline and circulate recommendations to all members in advance prior to meetings. The agreed policy memorandums would be submitted to the Track I in the form of concise report with deliverable policy recommendations. Other best practices also include the conduct of their meetings back-to-back with Track I meetings where possible, encourage regular interactions among its members with Track I including at bilateral levels and contact or invite the ASEAN Secretariat as resource person in the Track II main activity.

1.3. Ways Forward: Suggestions for NADI




Figure 3 shows a “review mechanism” that can ensure NADI is effective and continue to build momentum towards achieving what it sets to do in the TOR

In moving forward, SHHBIDSS suggests to consider further strengthening of NADI’s substantive and administrative processes. The strategies could be implemented in the Short, Medium and Long Term phases with the core objective to ensure shared ownership and capitalise on the capacity and capability of all its NADI members.

In all this, an overall review mechanism also needs to be in place. This mechanism is important to make sure NADI effectively continues to build momentum towards achieving what it sets to do in the NADI TOR. In this regard, the biennial NADI Retreat could be an ideal platform and would be timely to assess its achievements or identify gaps and sets the future agenda of NADI. It could also serve to monitor and ensure agreed past processes are maintained such as matrix document and agreed work programmes.

Rework (Immediate - short term)	Recreate (Medium term)	Revitalise (Long term)
<p><i>Review of current conduct of NADI activities:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Discussion on workshop concept and content by all NADI members. ▪ Number of workshops kept at three focused workshops per year to allow substantive preparation by all NADI members. ▪ Aim for three concrete NADI recommendations. ▪ Concise report output such as key takeaways from discussions. ▪ Limit number of presentations to three per session. ▪ Limit length of presentations. 	<p><i>Re-evaluate function and conduct of NADI activities:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Reassess and define functions of NADI meetings, workshops and retreat NADI meetings for example, to discuss on the work programme for the year or next two years. ▪ Trial of study groups or conduct of workshops among interested members which would open more use of experts, allow deeper discussion and propose direct implementable policy recommendations for all NADI members to consider as well as look into prospects of joint papers. 	<p><i>Invest in future of NADI:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Engage next generation of experts/ specialists/ academics back-to-back with NADI Meeting or Retreat ▪ Extend to other Track II network synergy of cooperation through NADI platforms such as NADI conference
<p align="center">Enhance ties among NADI members: Regular exchanges or visits and/or extend invitation to Track 1.5 or Track II conferences</p>		

2. Perspectives on Countering Extremist Narratives: Integrated Efforts and Approaches within ASEAN¹

Selina Farahiyah Teo



Countering extremist narratives from their infancy is critical to deter various extremist elements from being deeply embedded within any groups or societies and to prevent serious implications that would affect the nation and the region. Although the overall threats from extremist narratives in Brunei Darussalam remain low, the country remains equally vulnerable to the exposure and potential dangers posed by the spread of extremist narratives and infiltration of extremist elements. The exploitation of cyberspace as a platform to disseminate extremist narratives has made efforts in countering the threat more challenging, not just at the national, but also at the regional and international levels. While the increasing resolve and proliferation in counter-cyberspace exploitation efforts have been encouraging, what has become more apparent is that they are largely focused on response strategies without having much impact on nipping radicalisation and terrorist recruitment in the bud.



2.1. Overview

Countering extremist narratives from its infancy is critical to deter various extremist elements from being deeply imbedded within any groups or societies and prevent serious implications that would affect the nation and the region. Although the term or concept of extremist narratives have always been loosely defined, what remains clear is it aims to influence, exploit and recruit vulnerable individuals and groups for an extreme or violent cause. This in turn makes individuals and groups break away from accepted social norms as it normalises acts of violence.

¹ This commentary was prepared for the NADI Workshop on Countering Extremist Narratives: Integrated and Approaches within ASEAN from 18 to 22 April 2017, taking place in Suntra Wellness Resort and Hotel, Chachoengsao, Thailand.

It is unfortunate that most extremist narrative cases are immediately linked to Islam. As such, the international community through the UN and regional forums such as ASEAN, and the ARF has stressed that any terrorist, violent and extremist acts should not be associated to any religion, culture, nationality and civilisation.

This paper aims to briefly share what extremist narratives means from Brunei's perspectives, the underlying concerns and various counter-measures that have been put in place to address the matter as well as the current realities of the use of cyberspace in the spread of extremist narratives as the fastest growing security challenge to the region.

2.2. Brunei Darussalam's Perspective on Extremist Narratives

Extremist narratives to Brunei Darussalam is perceived as any act that would threaten Brunei's core values of being loyal to the Sultan and the State and ensuring social harmony and traditional practices of friendship and neighbourliness as espoused in the national philosophy and any acts of any form that would deviate from the belief in Islamic values that is in line with the teachings of *Abli Sunnah wal Jamaah*.

2.2.1. Concerns on Extremist Narratives


Although the overall threats from extremist narratives in Brunei remains low, the country remains equally vulnerable to the exposure and potential dangers posed by the spread of extremist narratives and infiltration of extremist elements. This could be through various platforms namely contacts of extremist individuals using Brunei as a transit point, online radicalisation and recruitment due to high access and usage of the Internet in Brunei and the possibility of indirectly assisting in terrorism funding such as through charities. As such, Brunei must remain vigilant and sensitive of changes in its surroundings and the potential implications of incidences in its neighbouring countries.

These three platforms are a continuous concern in view of Brunei's social make up that constitutes a young population of 109,500 (26% out of a total population of 417,200) that are aged between 15 to 29 years old. The country also face high numbers of unemployment where out of 10,446 unemployed, about 25.3% are among the youth. Coupled with this, the high and easy access to the Internet with an estimated 82% of the population are active internet users in the country, of which, the highest internet user segment is dominated by the youth from 18 to 34 years old at around 63%. This meant many are potentially at risk to

being influenced by extremist elements or vulnerable of being exploited by extremist individuals or groups. Additionally, with an increasing number of converts with an average of 500 people per year, they also may be at risk to be easily swayed and deviate away from the Islamic values Brunei holds close.

2.3. Counter Measures to Extremism

Brunei has heavily emphasised on preventive measures to ensure peace and stability for the whole nation and country including countering extremist narratives. The counter measures focuses on a comprehensive whole of government and nation approach through various forms of preventive measures, enforcement and monitoring initiatives and establishment as well as deradicalisation platforms.



Most of the counter measures are observed to be centred on the youth. Through strong religious and formal education foundation and various community outreach programs, it aims to instil values promoting a way of life based on universally accepted values to ensure justice, harmony, respect of differences and help one another. These values are also in line with the country's national philosophy of Malay Islamic Monarchy. The *Program Khidmat Bakti Negara* (PKBN) for example, is a non-conscription national service programme available for the youth between the ages of 16 to 21 years old. It was introduced in 2011 that aims to enhance patriotism, build resilience among youth and further strengthen their understanding of the constitution and the national philosophy.

Brunei also has a strong centralised authority on religious-related affairs. This includes regulating a standardised religious education curriculum, preparation of a standardised text in sermons, and screening of both Muslim and non-Muslim religious preachers to avoid misinterpretation of religious values and deter the spread of deviant ideology among the society. In addition to all these, the community plays an important proactive role to alert any suspicious activities to the authorities' attention as both preventive and enforcement measures.

However, irrespective of the counter measures that have been put in place, Brunei views that countering extremist narratives remains a growing challenge at a regional and global level due to the challenges posed by the cyberspace.

2.4. Realities of Cyberspace: Fastest Growing Security Challenge

Globalisation and rapid advancement in ICT has made the world today closely interconnected and interdependent. The Internet and social media is now a norm to source, and disseminate information. Societies today are highly dependent on ICT for quick information, point of reference and at the same time, are exposed to different ideas and ways of thinking. Such advancements in ICT clearly expose societies to various social ills and exploitation by opportunists and malicious groups. It is the same platform that is heavily capitalised by extremists to spread its various extremist ideology and narratives.

One of the main dangers of cyberspace is the readily available extremist views where “what has increasingly become disconcerting is the increasing number of radical websites that are not only in Arabic but also in English, Bahasa Indonesia and Bahasa Melayu. There are more than 200 Bahasa Indonesia and Bahasa Melayu radical sites that can be easily accessed by citizens in the Nusantara, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Southern Thailand and Southern Philippines”.ⁱ

The dark side of cyberspace is, “Aggravating the challenge for the national security agencies is the emergence of multiple social networks that appear harmless and innocuous but on further probing, can reveal different levels of radicalisation that can influence the readers as the messages are about how to view a particular problem and issue, often laced with religious justifications and theories...”.ⁱⁱ

Hence, cyberspace is rapidly becoming the region’s biggest challenge today due to the current realities on the misuse of cyberspace. There is also a potentially higher chance that cyberattacks will have spillover effects on other countries.

2.5. Further Considerations for Closer Cooperation on Cyberspace

There is a growing sense of urgency that requires many countries and region to reassess and re-strategise its approach in addressing security challenges including extremist narratives. ASEAN member states for instance have been involved in setting up their own cyber-security infrastructure and domestic initiatives.

It is observed that in 2016, there has been increasing recognition by countries in the region on the need to respond to the growing challenge of the cyberspace at national and regional level. At the regional level, Singapore, which aims to be a regional cybersecurity hub, has recently set up an ASEAN Cyber Capacity Program (ACCP) to help nations build the necessary infrastructure needed to combat cyber threats. The ASEAN Ministerial Conference in Singapore held in October 2016, also emphasised on the region’s need for an ASEAN cyber capacity-building, securing a safer common cyberspace, and facilitate exchanges on cyber norms. Malaysia too has established a Counter-Messaging Centre in 2016 with the aim to counter the growing extremist narratives in the region.

Under the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM), an Expert Working Group on Cyber Security has also been created in 2016 to address the rising challenges posed by the internet where the new cycle of coordinatorship for the latest EWG will take effect from 2018 to 2020. Looking at the trends in defence

cooperation, this may include preparing a list of focal points, sharing experiences and information and look into multilateral table top and field exercises. These are practical yet it may only look at the response or reactive end of cooperation.

2.6. Ways Forward for Regional Cooperation

As a way forward to counter extremist narratives, there is an increasing need for the region to focus on preventive measures to enable defence and security enforcement alike to take many steps ahead in countering extremist narratives. It is recommended that ASEAN in particular the ADMM to explore further into learning and sharing of best practices of national preventive measures and work towards promoting preventive cooperation at regional level through utilisation of existing platforms.

ⁱ Youth Self-Radicalisation: Lessons from the Singapore Narrative, online accessed:

<http://www.searcct.gov.my/publications/our-publications?id=66>

ⁱⁱ Ibid.

3. Defence Diplomacy and Cooperation: Contribution to Brunei and Region¹

Ampuan Yura Kasumanwati binti DP Hj Adnan



Defence diplomacy has always been one of the important components of Brunei Darussalam's security strategy as part of the integrated approach towards the achievement of the country's long-term national development vision, the *Wawasan 2035*. Defence diplomacy activities have significantly contributed to increasing trust and confidence between and among countries, improve capacity-building, contribute to regional peace and stability and raise the RBAF profile in the regional and international arena.



3.1. Overview

Defence diplomacy constitutes a tool of foreign policy and often plays an important role in its contribution to the nation's and even the region's peace, prosperity, security and stability. The paper presentation aims to share the importance of defence diplomacy and cooperation in contribution to Brunei's national security but also in fostering security and stability in the region and beyond. Further to this, it will also look at the positive trends in the region's defence diplomacy and cooperation. In particular, the paper will highlight the importance of defence diplomacy under the ASEAN framework and conclude with some thoughts on suggestions for NADI recommendations concerning enhancing defence diplomacy through the ADMM.

3.2. Importance of Defence Diplomacy and Cooperation to Brunei

His Majesty's *Titah* during the proclamation of independence on 1 January 1984 stated "the maintenance of friendly relations among nations on the principles of mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality and territorial integrity of all nations free from external interference". In essence, diplomacy through the building of friendship and cooperation plays a fundamental principle and intrinsic value embedded in Brunei's policy.

¹ This commentary was prepared for the NADI Workshop on Defence Diplomacy as a Way of Strengthening the Respect of Sovereignty from 25 to 28 July 2017, taking place in Bumi Surabaya City Resort, Surabaya, Indonesia.

For Brunei, defence diplomacy has always been one of the imperative operational objectives of its national security strategy as part of the integrated approach towards the achievement of the country's long term national development vision, the *Wawasan 2035*. There are three main goals in the *Wawasan 2035*, as follows:

- To make Brunei a nation which will be widely recognised for the accomplishment of its educated and highly skilled people as measured by the highest international standards.
- To achieve quality of life that is among the top 10 countries in the world.
- To build a dynamic and sustainable economy with an income per capita among the world's top 10.

The mission of defence is one of the strategic outcomes under the goal of high quality of life - which is upholding sovereignty and stability. In this regard, a National Security Committee, in which the Ministry of Defence is one of the core members, is responsible to look after the formulation and implementation of Brunei's strategies and initiatives towards the achievement of this strategic outcome. In delivering its mission, defence diplomacy is one of the three pillars of the nation's defence strategy.

3.3. Benefits of Defence Diplomacy to Brunei

Defence diplomacy comes in various forms and activities among its defence officials and the Royal Brunei Armed Forces. This could generally fall into bilateral and multilateral relations and cooperation built within the ASEAN security architecture. Through close cooperation, dialogue and other interactions, the four main outcomes that contribute to Brunei's defence strategy are namely increase in trust and confidence, improve capacity building, contribute to regional peace and stability and raise the RBAF profile in general.

The Ministry of Defence have signed MOUs with 18 countries including major powers and set up Defence Attaché and Defence Advisor offices in nine countries. Through its bilateral and multilateral defence diplomacy, Brunei has continued to build on relations and held various types and levels of interactions with over 60 countries. All these provide opportunities to build cooperation and the various exchanges provided Brunei valuable benefits through the sharing of information, learning of best practices and experiences. The RBAF's involvement in cooperative deployments in the IMT and UNIFIL serves as Brunei's commitment and contribution to peace and stability in the region. The experiences have also been beneficial in building a professional workforce.

The high priority placed on the importance of friendly relations is illustrated with its regional membership in ASEAN a week after Brunei regained its full independence on 1 Jan 1984. This also underscores the importance of ASEAN as a platform where Brunei could address common concerns through cooperation in economic and social development but also promoting political solidarity and security community. In support and commitment to ASEAN, His Majesty as the Defence Minister has stressed on the importance of preventive diplomacy in addressing challenges in the region. Under its ADMM Chairmanship in 2013, Brunei has championed Direct Communications Link, Logistics Support framework and became ADMM-Plus EWG co-chairman together with New Zealand on Maritime Security. The first major ADMM-Plus exercise on MS/HADR between international armed forces was also held in 2013 that brought had multiplied effect. One example is the close network among ASEAN military medicine officials that enabled them to communicate directly to coordinate response during the aftermath of Haiyan.

3.4. Growing Regional Defence Diplomacy and Cooperation

There are several regional defence diplomacy led mechanisms and levels: ASEAN framework, US led, and Track II. Overall, the regional defence diplomacy and cooperation is quite extensive and non-exhaustive. In the pre-ADMM, security issues were dealt under the ARF umbrella and the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) or Foreign Ministers. ASEAN led defence diplomacy started much later informally under the ambit of the ARF Defence Officials Dialogue (DOD) in 2002. Military interactions began earlier through informal means between chiefs of ASEAN defence forces and chiefs of military services.

Between the years of the ADMM and ADMM-Plus establishment, this saw the defence sector gaining momentum in its cooperation. Other spillovers, could be seen with the ASEAN-Japan Vice Minister Defence Forum or Toyko Defence Forum which usually shares its outcome in the ARF. Regional coordinated response practical exercises were held with ARF DiREX which is co-hosted by ASEAN and non-ASEAN member in ARF. The drive behind this could be attributed to ASEAN's experience in assisting Myanmar during Cyclone Nargis. It was indeed a wake-up call where no one country could stand alone when natural disaster strikes. This underscores the need for better coordination among ASEAN members, and pushed the implementation of AADMER forward thus saw the strengthening of cooperation in HADR flourish in the ADMM and ARF.

The attachment of ADMM saw numerous practical cooperation through the ADMM and ADMM-Plus Expert Working Groups (EWGs) being established. This is not inclusive of the various ADMM initiatives such as ASEAN Defence Industry Cooperation, Direct Communication Links and Logistics Support Framework. Further deepening of exchanges is seen among top levels as ASEAN defence ministers held further interactions with its dialogue partners and this brought prospects for closer cooperation in the ADMM-Plus. Even military diplomacy expanded include junior officer's exchange programmes, and the first multinational military exercises were also held during this period. As military roles evolve with the current environment, the military are becoming more involved in non-conventional activities and saw cooperation at the regional level instrumental to provide support when addressing transnational security challenges.

In comparison to pre-ADMM, the level of comfort, readiness to be open, willingness to share has improved and is a welcome trend in the region. This is certainly reflected with the increasing Track II or more specifically Track I.5 becoming more prominent as a platform to share views and perspectives on security issues. As ASEAN continues to be at the forefront of an inclusive and open regional security architecture, it also brings the broader dynamics of major power relations to the forefront. Incidentally, it is again through defence diplomacy that ASEAN pursues to manage regional and extra regional interests and set an agenda that befits ASEAN member states.

The proliferation of meetings is often used as a signal that diplomacy is in full swing. Yet more importantly for the ASEAN led security framework is the substance. The achievements or milestones of each regional activities or initiatives carried out lies in the contribution to building ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC) and to respective ASEAN member states' defence relations.

3.5. Contribution of ASEAN Defence Diplomacy

In observation, the ASEAN led defence diplomacy contribution is increasingly important for the region and its member states. Firstly, it adds value to respective efforts of ASEAN member states in protecting and defending its sovereignty. Defence diplomacy through ASEAN and its cooperation works as another layer that need not necessarily ran in parallel to bilateral defence diplomacy. It brings wider opportunities to enhance relations, build common ground on issues of concerns and deepen cooperation based on the principles and values shared and adhered to by ASEAN.

Therefore, regional diplomacy practice does not intend to dilute nor replace bilateral defence diplomacy. Through the various interactions and engagements of training, exchanges, courses and programme, all these avenues instil understanding between defence and military forces, thus further deepening trust and confidence. More often than not, cooperation also builds a nation's capability through sharing of information, learning best practices and experiences. The current patterns of cooperation that saw more mini-lateral cooperation that involves three or more countries in ASEAN working together or with other non-ASEAN countries which in turn further contributes to regional capability in addressing transnational and NTS security challenges.

Secondly, the establishment of defence diplomacy over time builds on ASEAN led architecture and expands and enhance cooperation. ASEAN arguably do not fulfil a security community or security regionalism broadly understood in theory. Over the past fifty years, ASEAN has developed and progressed in its unique mold conscious of its differences. The ADMM and ARF remains an important platform for ASEAN and allows its member states to continue to have a voice to shape and influence the region's future. In this regard, relations must continue to be deepened to enhance the comfort level among ASEAN through interactions at all levels among its defence and security officials. The security architecture noticeably is in silos which derived from the distinct three pillars and sectors conduct activities that may often duplicate. Within APSC itself, it is important to enhance synergy between ADMM, ADMM+, and ARF to address the cross-cutting issues comprehensively and effectively.

Finally, ASEAN defence diplomacy supports the assurance of regional peace and stability. Deepening of ADMM diplomacy and cooperation essentially improve the region's capability to respond to the security challenges. The positive momentum of ADMM cooperation needs to be constantly build upon through better management of its initiatives in order to improve responses to challenges in the region. In doing this, ADMM should continue to encourage and promote preventive and practical measures in its cooperation which thus contributes to a positive security environment in the future. Added to this, in line with the ASEAN Forging Ahead 2025, ADMM has to consider ways to promote strategic dialogue through greater sharing of views and perspectives.

3.6. Ways to Strengthen ADMM's Contribution

The work of the ADMM is reported to the APSC Council who will then submit progress and developments of the various sectors under APSC to the ASEAN Summit. It is imperative for the ADMM to know what it wants and lead the ADMM-Plus. In strengthening ADMM's contribution, the ADMM may need to further streamline its work and better manage ADMM initiative through means to measure its initiatives and efforts that would build on the overall regional response. The three suggestions for NADI recommendations to ADMM are:

Suggestions	Rationale	Ownership
<p>Scorecard on the implementation of ADMM Work Programme</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ADMM must stock-take its ADMM Work Programme in particular to assess the progress of initiatives, relevance and added value to ADMM ▪ In providing such document, it will provide a benchmark on the success of defence diplomacy and a guide to enhance ADMM's work 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ASEAN Secretariat for submission as a document to be updated by ADSOM WG, approved by ADSOM and endorsed by ADMM ▪ Inputs by ADMM Chair & ADMM EWG co-chairman will be useful
<p>Information Paper on cross cutting issues in ADMM and ARF or other initiatives under APSC pillar</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ This supplement the Scorecard on other information required to assess ADMM's work ▪ Updates of cross-cutting issues in various security platforms particularly maritime security, HADR, countering terrorism and cyber security would provide insight on initiatives from various sectors would enable ADMM to build on to the overall regional response 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ASEAN Secretariat information paper to update ADMM on the progress on cross-cutting issues ▪ Inputs by ADMM EWG Co-Chairman will be useful
<p>Standardised information in promoting strategic dialogue and understanding of individual's perspectives</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Consideration to agree on standardised sub-headings to encourage sharing of information of each ASEAN member state's contribution in ADMM and the APSC in the ASEAN Security Outlook and ARF Security Outlook publications 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ADMM and respective ASEAN member states

4. Evaluating ASEAN Defence and Security Initiatives with Dialogue Partners: Cybersecurity¹

Refana binti Mohd Juanda



Substantive cybersecurity discussions began to surface in ASEAN around the year 2000, with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) focusing on cyberterrorism, while the ASEAN Telecommunications and IT Ministers (TELMIN) discussing ICT-related initiatives in contributing towards the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). The TELMIN began formal engagements with Dialogue Partners in 2006 with China, which later expanded to other Dialogue Partners and external parties.



4.1. Overview

Substantive cybersecurity discussions began to take root in ASEAN roughly 17 years ago, with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) focusing on cyberterrorism, while the ASEAN Telecommunications and IT Ministers (TELMIN) discussing ICT-related initiatives in contributing towards the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). Thus as a security challenge, cybersecurity is cross-sectoral in nature and cooperation among ASEAN Member States and with Dialogue Partners can involve sectors other than the ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC) pillar.

Overtime, regional cooperation in cybersecurity deepened and expanded to include more areas of cooperation as well as more partners. While this trend is encouraging, there is a risk of duplication of work given that the areas of cooperation in different sectors now overlap. There is also a need to ensure that future cooperation is pursued in a holistic manner, as it contributes towards readiness and preparedness in responding to a cyber-related emergency.

¹ This commentary was prepared for the NADI Workshop on Evaluating ASEAN Defence and Security Initiatives with Dialogue Partners from 14 to 17 August 2017, taking place in Pullman Kuala Lumpur City Center Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

4.2. ASEAN Telecommunications and IT Ministers (TELMIN)

The TELMIN is a platform where all ICT-related discussions in ASEAN take place. It was formed in 2001 under the AEC, to harness the potentials of ICTs and help achieve goals outlined in the AEC. In the ASEAN ICT Masterplan 2015, the cyber security dimension falls under the fourth Strategic Thrust called Infrastructure Development. In the ASEAN ICT Masterplan 2020 (AIM2020) however, it assumes a standalone category as the eighth Strategic Thrust.

Looking at the priority areas of the two masterplans, the 2015 Masterplan lays emphasis on the Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) as well as efforts towards enhancing partnerships for data security. In the AIM2020, the region seeks to develop regional guidelines, principles and approaches, in addition to continuing efforts to enhance the CERTs and data security.

These two observations show efforts towards deepening cooperation among ASEAN Member States as well as with Dialogue Partners. These efforts could stem from a realisation that the region needs to pay more attention to cybersecurity. They could also indicate a growing confidence among the TELMIN ministers following successful partnerships undertaken under the 2015 Masterplan.

4.3. ASEAN-Japan Cooperation

The TELMIN began formal engagements with Dialogue Partners in 2006 with China. Cooperation was expanded to other Dialogue Partners and external parties in subsequent years, including South Korea, Japan, India, the European Union (EU) and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). There was a heavy emphasis on capacity-building in these cooperation, ranging from training to infrastructure development and policy development. When it comes to cybersecurity, it appears that Japan has more developed cooperation with the TELMIN.

Substantive engagement in cybersecurity between ASEAN and Japan began in 2009 with the convening of the ASEAN-Japan Information Security Policy Meeting¹. Apart from annual dialogues, there were practical cooperation aiming to enhance capacities. Capacity-building remains an important feature in ASEAN-Japan cybersecurity cooperation up to today, where initiatives such as the Enhancing Information Security for ASEAN: Focusing on ISMS and ICS (Information Control System) Security training program and the ASEAN Cyber Capacity Programme (ACCP) were conducted.

The latest ASEAN-Japan Information Security Policy Meeting that took place in October 2016 took note of the following progress:

- Established an information sharing system where officials would be able to share information and swiftly respond to incidents in the event of an attack.
- Acknowledged new guidelines concerning protection of critical information infrastructures in Japan and ASEAN. Workshops may be held in 2017 to introduce and discuss the implementation of the new guidelines.
- Discussed the possibility of long-term training programs, in addition to short-term training courses that Japan has been providing for ASEAN Member States.

Here, it is clear that ASEAN-Japan cooperation has developed to include important aspects of cybersecurity such as information-sharing and developing shared guidelines. They constitute the targets outlined in the AIM2020, in particular, the development of guidelines to protect critical information infrastructures.

Information-sharing platforms between Japan and ASEAN include the Japan-ASEAN Security Partnership (JASPER), which provides visuals of traffic flow and activities, including the neutralisation of threats. Additionally, the Internet Traffic Monitoring Data Sharing (TSUBAME) project provides CERT's threat analyses to facilitate response.

Cybersecurity engagements between ASEAN and Japan also take place outside of the TELMIN framework, such as in the ARF and the ASEAN-Plus Japan Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC).

4.4. Cooperation in Cyber Norms

In addition to capacity-building and information-sharing, the region is moving towards new areas of cooperation: cyber norms and international law in the cyber space. These topics have been discussed in the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (UN GGE), a working group in the United Nations that focuses on cybersecurity. In 2013, the UN GGE made two important recommendations:

firstly, there is a need to promote understanding on cyber norms as a means to reduce risks in the cyber space; and secondly, it affirmed the applicability of international law in the cyber space.

ASEAN Member States have been participating in discussions concerning cyber norms and applicability of international law in the cyber space. Indonesia was part of the 2014-2015 session of the UN GGE, while Malaysia took part in the subsequent 2016-2017 session. In addition, during the ASEAN Ministerial Conference on Cybersecurity in October 2016, Singapore called for ASEAN to begin dialogue on cyber norms.

4.5. Risk of Duplication of Work

It is evident that there is a positive momentum in cybersecurity cooperation in the region. Cooperation thrives with the presence of a handful of bilateral and multilateral platforms. Renowned organisations are positioning their cybersecurity bases in the region such as the INTERPOL, Palo Alto Networks, Boeing and Microsoft. ASEAN Member States have undertaken their own initiatives to contribute to the momentum, such as the Philippines' proposal for an ADMM-Plus EWG on Cybersecurity, the Singapore International Cyber Week (SICW) and Thailand's call for an ASEAN Cyber Unit.

However, amidst the thriving cybersecurity cooperative landscape, there is a risk of duplication of work as areas of cooperation overlap. For instance, both the Japan-ASEAN Cybercrime Dialogue and the ACCP focuses on cybercrime -- do these initiatives make conscious effort to leverage on each other's progress in cybersecurity engagements? The same can be said of the CERT platform and the ADMM-Plus EWG on Cybersecurity, where both focus on effective response to a cybersecurity-related emergency. In the ARF's Work Plan on Security of and in the Use of Information and Communications Technologies, it stated its aim to establish a contacts database -- how is this different from the database that the CERTs has?

Thus, there is a need to clarify the roles of each mechanism in the regional cybersecurity landscape. ASEAN has undertaken such effort before. The 23rd ASEAN Summit in 2013 called for the formation of a joint task force to accelerate well-coordinated and concerted effortsⁱⁱ in HADR, which was later known as the Joint Task Force to Promote Synergy with other Relevant ASEAN Bodies on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief. In 2015, the ASEAN Military Preparedness on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Seminar produced a diagram identifying how each HADR mechanism links with each

other, thus clarifying their roles during a cyber-incident. Therefore, TELMIN’s endorsement of the ASEAN Cyber Security Cooperation Strategy in 2016 is a positive move in this respect.




Figure 4 shows a diagram produced during the ASEAN Military Preparedness on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Seminar in August 2015, aiming to clarify the linkages of regional HADR mechanisms during a cyber incident.

4.6. Ways Forward

Unlike HADR, cybersecurity mechanisms have not been tested yet against a real cyber incident that warrants a regional response. Thus, it is difficult to gauge the level of preparedness and readiness of the cybersecurity architecture. Scenario-based exercises such as the ASEAN CERT Incident Drill (ACID), ASEAN-Japan Cyber Exercise and the cyber-attack defence training conducted by the NEC are positive developments, but it is important to pursue a more holistic approach to threat mitigation and neutralisation. As in HADR, this approach often involves the participation of multiple agencies and the public.

5. Perspectives on Marine Environmental Protection in Brunei Darussalam¹

Selina Farahiyah Teo



In recent years, there has been an increasing level of awareness among Brunei Darussalam's population on the importance of the marine environment and the need to protect it. As the country pursues economic diversification, there is a growing recognition on the need for delicate balance in pursuant of industrialisation vis-à-vis the sustainability of marine environment. Accordingly, responsible departments, policies, regulations and legal instruments have been institutionalised that serve to protect the overall marine environment in the country.



5.1. Overview

East Asia is predominantly a maritime region and is dependent on its marine environment for resources, trade and communication. This makes the sustainability of marine resources in addition to the safety and security of sea lines of communication extremely crucial.

In the past decade, the region has gone through tremendous maritime and land development that increasingly threatens the marine ecosystem as a whole. This is especially in terms of excessive extraction of resources from the sea through fishing and drilling, overcrowding of sea lanes by both commercial and non-commercial shipping, and implications of extensive reclamation work on marine environment in the South China Sea. Other incidences caused by vessels such as oil spill and dumping of waste that damages coral reefs and other marine inhabitant effects the longevity of critical resources in the marine environment. Tensions and disputes driven by resources competition further compounded challenges for the safety and security in the maritime domain.

¹ This commentary was prepared for the 3rd NADI Retreat and NADI Workshop on Marine Environmental Protection from 21 to 25 November 2017, taking place in Summit Ridge Hotel, Tagaytay City, the Philippines.

This paper shares the protection of Brunei Darussalam’s marine environment, which highlights the role of national agencies involved, national legal instruments that are in place, and ways to enhance regional efforts in marine environmental protection.

5.2. Marine Environmental Protection in Brunei

In recent years, there have been increasing levels of awareness among the population on the importance of the marine environment and the need to protect it. The acts of preserving the marine environment are addressed by a growing participation among the public and private sectors in the country including non-governmental organisations and marine enthusiasts’ individuals. These efforts are important and in line with the National Development Programmes and strategies towards achieving Vision 2035. A few selected examples on how certain local conservation initiatives are further strengthened with the enforcement of national laws:

INITIATIVES	ENFORCEMENT
Managing the overexploitation of fish resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Controlling and specifying the fishing methods and equipment that are allowed and types of fish allowed to be catch
Maintaining breeding grounds	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Established Marine Protected Areas ▪ Introduction of manmade reefs to increase the number of breeding areas.
Turtle conservation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Banning of the sales of turtle eggs
River clean up	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Establishment of the Department of Environment, Park and Recreation to ensure the cleanliness of local rivers

5.3. National agencies involved in Marine Environmental Protection

As other countries in the region, Brunei continues to pursue economic diversification for sustainable economic growth. There is a growing recognition on the need for delicate balance in pursuant of economic development including through industrialisation vis-à-vis the sustainability of marine environment. This requires close coordination, consultation and cooperation among agencies and ministries. At the same time, the protection of marine environment needs related agencies between countries to work together, bilaterally and/or multilaterally as the challenges and impact to the marine environment are transboundary in nature.

Domestically, in Brunei Darussalam, several ministries are directly and indirectly involved in safeguarding the marine environment. This includes several agencies and departments from the Prime Ministers' Officer, Ministry of Energy and Industry, Ministry of Communications, Ministry of Primary Resources and Tourism, Ministry of Development, Ministry of Health, Marine Police and the Royal Brunei Armed Forces; as well as numerous oil and gas industries located inshore and offshore.

Depending on the area of the marine environment, each agency or department has implemented certain policies, regulations and legal instruments that serve to protect the overall marine environment. This ranges from issues related to deterring illegal fishing activities, monitor breeding grounds and coral reefs within the EEZ and rivers, river-friendly land activities, ensure proper inflow and outflow of sewage, designating waste dumping areas, river clean up, and environmental impact by industrial related activities including oil spills and waste etc.

The main front liners in dealing with the protection of the marine environment are the Maritime Port Authority and the Department of Fisheries. Below are its role and examples of the national legal instruments that are adopted and in place and some regional legal instruments or conventions that Brunei are party to and other initiatives involved:

Main Agencies	Role / Areas of responsibilities	National legal instruments	Regional legal instruments/conventions /initiatives
<p data-bbox="166 1334 401 1426">Maritime Port Authority, Ministry of Communications</p> <p data-bbox="169 1559 398 1616">REGULATORY & ENFORCEMENT</p>	<p data-bbox="440 1244 743 1336">Impose regulation on vessels going in and out of the country (in line with IMO)</p> <p data-bbox="440 1418 743 1545">Monitor pollution caused by vessels going in and out of the country and fixed platforms</p> <p data-bbox="464 1674 719 1766">Chairman of the Brunei National Oil Spill Contingency Plan</p>	<p data-bbox="785 1244 1031 1357">Ports Act, 1984 Prevention of Pollution of the Sea Order, 2005</p> <p data-bbox="769 1438 1047 1530">Maritime Offences (Ships and Fixed Platforms) Order, 2007</p> <p data-bbox="769 1663 1047 1721">Merchant Shipping (Civil Liability and</p>	<p data-bbox="1072 1244 1404 1371">Brunei ratified Annex 1 to 5 of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL)</p> <p data-bbox="1083 1449 1393 1575">Implementation of the International Ships and Port Facilities Security Code (ISPS Code)</p> <p data-bbox="1088 1657 1389 1776">ASEAN Maritime Transport Working Group (ASEAN MTWG) and BIMP-EAGA through the Sea Linkages</p>

	(NOSCOP) and serve as the focal point and lead agency	Compensation for Oil Pollution) Order, 2008 Maritime and Port Authority of Brunei Darussalam Order, 2017	Working Group (BIMP-EAGA SLWG) Bilateral agreement with Malaysia on oil spill matters
Department of Fisheries, Ministry of Primary Resources and Tourism REGULATORY & ENFORCEMENT (with assistance from RBN)	Conduct patrolling along the EEZ for any illegal activities together with Marine Department and Royal Brunei Navy Conservation of the sensitive breeding ground of marine resources Focal point in marine scientific research	Brunei Darussalam Fishery Limits Act (Act No. 5 of 1983) 1972 Fisheries Enactment Chapter 130 Fisheries Limit Chapter 61 Fisheries Order Environmental Protection and Management Order 2016	The Coordination Committee of the Regional Plan of Action (RPOA) to promote responsible fishing practices The East Asia Summit Track II Study on Enhancing Food Security through Sustainable Fisheries Management and Marine Environment Conservation Participate in ASEAN Fisheries Working Group activities including SEAFDEC Joint ASEAN-SEAFDEC Declaration on Regional Cooperation for Combating IUU and Enhancing the Competitiveness of ASEAN Fish and Fishery Products

5.4. Importance of Marine Environmental Protection

5.4.1. Safeguard one's sovereignty, sovereignty rights and jurisdiction

Article 56 of UNCLOS states that coastal states have the *sovereign rights* 'for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds.'

The Article 56 also provide support for coastal states to exercise its jurisdiction to establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; conduct marine scientific research; and protect and preserve its marine environment. This is also stipulated in Brunei’s EEZ Proclamation of 1994, Article 7, rights within the Zone.

5.4.2. Huge source of economic income and revenue

Marine resources have always been a great source of economic revenue, which makes it even more crucial for its resources to be properly managed, preserved and not overexploited. Brunei Darussalam is no stranger to IUU where in 2014, Brunei lost \$19 million, which is an increase of \$6million, compared to 2011 where most cases were done by illegal foreign fishing vessels, fishing without a license and destructive fishing practices with the use of poison and explosives. Brunei Darussalam, through the Department of Fisheries, is currently strengthening its efforts to protect its marine environment especially in deterring IUU within its EEZ and territorial waters. In this matter, the Royal Brunei Navy provide support to the Department of Fisheries in the enforcement of IUU. Brunei has also been exploring its opportunities to expand and widen its investment especially in capturing fisheries, aquaculture and seafood processing. The fisheries and aquaculture have great potential where by 2023, it is estimated to worth around B\$400 million and B\$200 million per year respectively.

5.4.3. Preservation and Conservation of marine life and environment

The protection of marine environment is vital for the whole underwater ecosystems as “they regulate the climate, prevent erosion, accumulate and distribute solar energy, absorb carbon dioxide, and maintain biological control” despite being vulnerable to climate-induced sea warming. Coastal and marine habitats such as coral reefs and wetlands such as mangroves and peat swamp help to prevent erosion and flooding.

Efforts to promote climate change adaptation through preservation and conservation in marine life and environment have been carried out by relevant agencies and even non-government organisations. The Department of Fisheries has done numerous initiatives including the preservation of mangroves and man-made reefs to encourage the progressive growth of shrimp and fish production. Apart from that, there are also diving operators such as Oceanic Quest who conduct its own project to conserve the marine environment including installation of artificial reefs as breeding grounds. Currently, Oceanic Quest is conducting a project to increase the nation’s coral coverage and to ensure they are able to endure the rising ocean temperature.

5.5. Ways Forward

The region's marine environment is facing increasing challenges as a consequence of numerous factors varying from overfishing, rapid development on land and sea, oil and gas explorations, natural phenomenon and climate change. Although there have been several initiatives done in trying to 'put back what we have taken out of the ocean' at domestic level, more is needed at the regional level. The preservation and protection of marine environment is a life-long endeavour.

ASEAN member states consists of maritime countries and invariably linked to the sea with Indonesia, Vietnam and Myanmar being the top 10 fish producing countries globally; while the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam invested hugely in aquaculture. Ongoing cooperation is necessity as ASEAN member states pursue its economic sustainability and endeavour to fulfil an ASEAN Economic Community. Further considerations to strengthen cooperation in maritime issues from safety, security and marine environment through:

- Improving coordination and collaboration with one another in addressing a wide range of marine environment issues;
- Sharing best practices including legal aspects and HR related matters that is most suitable for each of their marine environment;
- Investing in land and marine-friendly technologies and have the technology-know-how to ensure the sustainability of its marine environment.



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